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A Korean ERP vendor killed its own hosted business at 160 customers, spent two years rebuilding as genuinely multi-tenant, and enforced one rule: if a decision needs a human hand, don't make it
₩100,000/mo example list price (Korean won) · Azure bill cut from ~₩9M to ~₩3M a month once elastic scaling worked · ~₩100M/year paid to Microsoft
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In 2000, Younglimwon Soft Lab launched an ASP business — hosted software billed monthly, before anyone called it cloud. Customers connected to a solution running in an internet data centre and paid a monthly fee instead of a licence. It sold to 160 customers and then the company stopped selling it. The reason is the most valuable sentence in the talk. There was no licence revenue, but the work was still being done the on-premise way, per customer, by hand. "The more of these we sold, the more the company would fail." So they cut it off at 160 rather than scale a model that lost money on every additional unit. What followed was a rebuild rather than a migration. Professor Park Jun-seong drilled three rules into the team leads, and the speaker — who runs the cloud SaaS business at Younglimwon — lists them in order: it has to be multi-tenant, single code and single instance; it has to be self-service, with the customer's need to ask you anything driven as close to zero as possible; and provisioning has to be automated. They spent two years redesigning from scratch, including redefining who the target was and what the service would be, instead of lifting the existing on-premise product into a data centre. The infrastructure decision came in 2011, when they compared providers and chose Microsoft Azure, specifically for elastic scaling and because, as the speaker puts it, SaaS should run on PaaS — rent infrastructure and build the environment yourself and every ongoing platform advance becomes your problem to chase. The result at the time of the talk, in December 2019: the cloud ERP runs about 120 customers across three Microsoft regions, sold domestically through partners, with provisioning, metering, invoicing and collection automated end to end. The third thing he wanted to say is that Korea's domestic SaaS market has a ceiling, and that the business has to go global.
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Join the Unicorn Club — $5/moCancel in one click · first payment refundable for 7 daysData credibility: 🗣 Founder-Reported, with a caveat on the label: the speaker is the executive who runs the cloud SaaS business at Younglimwon Soft Lab, not the company's founder, and he is presenting his own operation at a Talk IT industry session published on 2019-12-10 alongside Professor Park Jun-seong. Every figure is first-party and unaudited: 160 ASP customers before shutdown, about 120 live SaaS customers, the ₩100,000 monthly fee used as an example in a negotiation anecdote, the Azure bill falling from about ₩9 million to about ₩3 million a month, roughly ₩100 million a year paid to Microsoft, ₩25 million a year for the marketing tool, six VM sets, three regions, and roughly twenty minutes from signup to a provisioning confirmation email. No revenue, no margin, no headcount and no Japanese customer count were disclosed. All amounts are in Korean won as stated — the talk gives no USD conversion and none is invented here. Two names are damaged by the auto-caption: the product name is truncated to a fragment with the portal given as "시스템 .co.kr", which we render as SystemEver, and the marketing SaaS vendor's name is unrecoverable, so only its cost, billing terms and Australian data centre are reported. The "last July" and "that September" references are relative to a December 2019 talk. Because the talk is from 2019, treat every number as a snapshot of that year rather than of today.